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“If You Poison Us Do We Not Die?”—A Critical Analysis of
the Legality of Poison Puts in the Wake of San Antonio
Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s was a decade of big hair, power suits, and hostile
takeovers. While the impact of many of the decade’s trends has
slowly faded, the takeover wave of the ’80s changed corporate
governance in a lasting way. The increase in hostile takeover bids
gave rise to new and innovative antitakeover tactics by boards of
directors. Among these tactics is the infamous collection of “poison
pills, greenmail, the ‘Pac Man’ defense, white knights, and golden
parachutes.”1 Despite the prevalence of these defenses, a similar, and
oft-used provision—the “poison put”—had not been the subject of
litigation until recently. In 2009, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension
Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 a case with two poison puts
at issue, broke the silence in this critical area of the law.
In Amylin, the provisions were a particular kind of poison put—
“proxy puts.” A proxy put is a provision in a debt contract that
accelerates the bondholder’s rights in a contract when a change
occurs in the majority of the board of directors without the approval
of the incumbent directors.3 Once a change triggers the provision,
the bondholder can sell back the bonds at par value. In Amylin, two
prominent shareholders of Amylin Pharmaceuticals nominated fiveperson slates for spots on the company’s board of directors.4
Consequently, if all ten nominees succeeded in their proxy elections
and ousted the incumbent directors, the change would have affected
the majority of the eleven-person board and would have triggered
proxy puts in an Amylin debt indenture and credit agreement.5 This
1. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder
Protection or Management Entrenchment, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931, 944 (1993).
2. 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009).
3. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin
Pharms., Inc., 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009) (No. 268).
4. San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms, Inc., C.A. No. 4446VCL at 4 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2009), http://law.du.edu/documents/corporategovernance/governance-cases/Antonio-Fire-Police-Memorandum-Opinion.pdf.
5. Id.
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possibility was problematic because, at that time, the bonds were
trading so far below par value that if they were put back to Amylin
the company would likely become insolvent.6 The plaintiff in the
case, a pension fund and Amylin shareholder, sued Amylin for,
among other things, injunctive relief invalidating the proxy puts.7
Neither Vice Chancellor Lamb of the Delaware Court of Chancery
nor the Delaware Supreme Court went as far as invalidating the
provisions, however, and both courts gave the Amylin board of
directors the beneficial deference of the business judgment rule.8
In examining the Delaware courts’ decisions in Amylin, this
Note critically analyzes the legality of poison put provisions
generally, and proxy puts specifically. While I do not assert that
poison puts, or even proxy puts, should be per se illegal, I propose a
rule that when a board of directors decides to include a proxy put in
an agreement, it must demonstrate a compelling justification for
doing so. In making this argument, I am not attempting to argue for
9
either side of the current debate on an increased shareholder role.
Rather, I argue that proxy puts infringe on “shareholders’ statutorily
10
defined role,”
by infringing on the shareholder franchise’s
recognized right to vote in a contested election of directors.
This Note will bolster this proposed rule through an examination
of the policy behind poison put provisions, their fiduciary duty
implications, and their infringement on shareholder authority. Part II
begins with a survey of poison put provisions generally, reviewing
6. Id. at 8.
7. Id. at 9.
8. See San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 981 A.2d
1173 (Del. 2009); Amylin, C.A. No. 4446-VCL.
9. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing for an alternative regime allowing shareholders a more prominent
corporate governance). But see Leo E. Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1759 (2006) (addressing Bebchuk’s article from the view of an “open-minded
corporate law ‘traditionalist’”).
10. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder
Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 299 (2001). Like Professors
Robert Thompson and Gordon Smith, I am not trying to advocate the “broad general
preference for shareholder decision making that frightened judges in the aftermath of the
director passivity discussions of the early 1980s.” Id. at 46. Rather, I argue that while
“directors may use defensive tactics to protect other constituencies or to gain higher returns
for shareholders” and that “shareholders are capable of using their power to prefer themselves
over other corporate constituencies,” shareholder voting falls within the “limited and
nuanced” sacred space that “emanates from the shareholders’ statutorily defined role.” See
generally id.
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and examining the potential benefits that poison puts can have on
bondholders, shareholders, and directors respectively. Part II also
considers the particular detriments that poison puts might bring to
the firm through the agency cost framework. This section highlights
particularly problematic aspects of proxy puts and demonstrates why
they should be subjected to heightened legal scrutiny. Part III
focuses on the legal standards for hostile takeovers and the
implications that fiduciary duty law has on these change of control
covenants. Part IV recounts the facts and analysis from Amylin, and
Part V discusses how although the court was correct in concluding
that the directors’ actions would normally be safe under the business
judgment rule, in the instant case, allowing proxy put provisions in
the agreements should have required a compelling justification, and
the provisions should have been invalidated.
II. POISON PUTS GENERALLY
Proxy puts are a form of change of control covenants (more
infamously known as “poison puts”) used in debt indentures. The
purported purpose of these covenants is to shield bondholders from
takeover-related losses.11 Because issuers are offering this protection,
12
they can theoretically issue the bonds at lower interest rates. Poison
puts consist of two parts: a trigger and a remedy.13 The trigger is
normally either a takeover-related event (e.g., an acquisition or a
change in the board’s majority through the proxy process), or the
downgrading of a bond’s credit rating, or both.14 The bondholder’s
remedy is either a put—the right to sell the bonds to the company at
a set price—or an increased interest rate on the bonds.15 In the case
of a proxy put, bondholders can sell back their bonds at par value
when there is a change in the majority of the board that has not been
approved by the incumbent directors—regardless of the current
value of the bonds. Again, the purported purpose of poison puts is to

11. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 934; see Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley,
Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 620 (2003)
(noting that some “change of control provisions serve legitimate purposes in certain
situation . . . . Penalty provisions may improve the joint welfare of contracting parties when
third parties can expect to suffer losses in the event of a change of control . . . .”).
12. Kahan & Kausner, supra note 1, at 940.
13. Id. at 936.
14. Id. at 936–37.
15. Id. at 937.
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protect the bondholders, but, particularly with proxy puts, the
board’s underlying motivation is potentially problematic. Much of
the debate surrounding poison puts centers on a key question: is the
purpose of the covenant to protect bondholders from take-over
related losses (and thus increase the value of the firm) or is it to
entrench the board of directors (and thus decrease the value of the
firm)?16
A. Benefits of Poison Puts
Theoretically, change of control covenants can provide value to
bondholders, shareholders, and directors.17 In an excellent
examination of poison puts, their effects, and the motivation for
including them in debt indentures, Professors Marcel Kahan and
Michael Klausner gave critical insight that assists in determining if
and when poison put provisions should be legal. In this section, I
will summarize their arguments and conclusions regarding the
potential value of poison puts to bondholders, shareholders, and
directors. First, I will address how poison puts allegedly serve
bondholder interest by protecting against the increased leverage that
can accompany an acquisition or recapitalization. Second, I will
consider how this bondholder benefit can reduce a firm’s agency cost
of debt and, in turn, increase its value and benefit the shareholders.
Finally, I will examine the managerial interests in these provisions.
1. Bondholder protection
Take-over related events can potentially harm bondholders by
increasing a firm’s leverage and therefore decreasing its ability to
repay its bonds. As an issuing corporation increases in leverage, its
credit rating (which measures its ability to repay its bonds)
decreases.18 For instance, empirical studies show that leveraged
acquisitions in the 1980s decreased the values of outstanding bonds
by 5–7%.19 Bonds are considered low-risk investments, and such a
16. See id.; see also Arlen & Talley, supra note 11 (“Although many existing penalty
change of control provisions are value enhancing, managers subject to shareholder choice
could readily employ such provisions defensively, at shareholders’ expense.”).
17. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 980.
18. See, e.g., id. at 937–50.
19. Id. at 940 (citing Arthur Warga & Ivo Welch, Bondholder Losses in Leveraged
Buyouts, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 959, 979 (1993)); Paul Asquith & Thierry Wizman, Event Risk,
Covenants, and Bondholder Returns in Leveraged Buyouts, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 203 (1990).
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decrease can be problematic for bondholders. However, a poison put
provision can reduce the risk of bond depreciation by assuring
bondholders that the possible decrease in credit rating accompanied
by a take-over will be recompensed, either by a put option at a
predetermined price or an interest rate adjustment.20 Because
bondholders receive this insurance, corporations can theoretically
issue bonds with poison puts at lower interest rates.21
2. Shareholder benefits
Shareholders benefit from change of control covenants if the
provisions can succeed in increasing the overall value of the firm—
i.e., “the aggregate value of the firm’s stocks and bonds.”22 In
analyzing the possible benefits of poison puts, Kahan and Klausner
used the Jensen and Meckling agency cost framework23 to examine a
poison put’s impact on the agency cost of debt.24
At first blush, conflict arises because shareholders’ interests can
be inapposite to bondholders.’25 Because shareholders’ claims are
“unlimited on the upside and limited on the downside,” they prefer
riskier strategies and higher dividends.26 Conversely, bondholders
prefer a conservative business strategy; if the corporation retains its
earnings, it increases the probability that it will have the funds to
According to Warga’s and Welch’s studies, bond values declined by about 7% per year from
1985 to 1988. Id. at n.22. Asquith’s and Wizman’s study showed that from 1980 to 1988
bondholders whose bonds “were not protected by traditional bond covenants suffered
abnormal returns of -5.3%.” Id. However, Kahan and Klausner cite earlier studies that found
only minimal negative impact on bond values. Id. (citing Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen,
Leveraged Buyouts: Wealth Created or Wealth Redistributed, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 46 (Murray L. Weidenbaum & Kenneth W. Chilton eds., 1988);
Laurentius Marais et al., Wealth Effects of Going Private for Senior Securities, 23 J. FIN. ECON.
155 (1989)).
20. Id. at 943; see also Arlen & Talley, supra note 11 (“[T]o protect themselves from
substantial potential costs associated with a change of control, third parties may reasonably
insist on change of control provisions that give them the right to terminated the contract on
favorable terms: terms that confer a benefit on the third party and a penalty on the contracting
firm.”).
21. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 937–38.
22. See id. at 938.
23. Id. (“The starting point in analyzing the impact of any bond covenant on firm value
is the agency cost framework developed by Jensen and Meckling.”).
24. Id. (“The agency cost of debt is a product of the conflicting interests of shareholders
and bondholders once bonds have been issued.”).
25. See id.
26. Id.
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repay its debt.27 The result of these competing interests can
incentivize a company to “engage in transactions that lower the
value of the firm but nevertheless increase shareholder wealth by
shifting wealth from bondholders to shareholders.”28 Such an
instance would not additionally benefit bondholders if the company
succeeded, but they would certainly suffer if the company failed.
“The present value of the contingent losses in aggregate firm value
attributable to such potential actions is referred to as an agency cost
of debt.”29 Under the agency cost framework, the shareholders bear
the agency cost of debt.30
Because bondholders are aware that companies can engage in
activities that will shift wealth to shareholders, they can demand
higher interest rates as ex ante compensation.31 Consequently,
shareholders, who bear the cost of the increased interest rate, can
have an interest in reducing the agency cost of debt, even though
doing so might deny them the option of taking a potential riskshifting action.32 Poison puts can therefore potentially increase share
values—and the firm value as a whole—to the extent that they lower
the interest rates on bonds and preclude wealth-reducing actions.33
However, if the poison put protection is not reflected in the bond

27. Id.
28. Id. Kahan and Klausner give an example of a company implementing a leveraged
recapitalization in which it pays out a large dividend to shareholders by borrowing money. Id.
Doing so would potentially decrease the value of the firm and could even lead the business to
bankruptcy. Id. Despite the potential for overall loss to the firm, however, shareholders could
gain from the transaction while, conversely, bondholders would lose. Id. at 938–39.
29. Id. at 939 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334–37
(1976)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. However, it is worth noting that the shareholder gains from acquisitions
normally greatly exceed the losses to bondholders. Id. at 940 (citing Asquith & Wizman, supra
note 19, at 212).
33. Id.
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price,34 then bondholders benefit from a windfall at the shareholders’
expense.35
Additionally, because the benefit to shareholders in takeovers is,
on average, far greater than the loss to bondholders,36 takeovers can
generally increase firm values.37 As a result, some scholars have
concluded that bondholder protections cannot increase the
aggregate value of a firm.38 While these arguments seem to weigh in
favor of making a bright-line, per se rule against poison puts, the
potential that a poison put brings for reducing the agency cost of
debt, coupled with the chance that it could prevent wealth-reducing
action, could theoretically justify a board’s decision to employ these
provisions in a debt indenture as a rational business decision.
Additionally, poison put provisions may increase firm value by
enhancing efficiency with respect to wealth-increasing, takeoverrelated activity.39 Although an acquisition can greatly increase firm
value, it is possible that this increase is due to changes in
management and operating efficiencies.40 In fact, the increased
leverage might actually have a negative impact on the firm—e.g.,
from inefficient investment policies.41 Despite that potential negative
impact, shareholders would likely support the increased leverage if it
transferred wealth from the target firm’s bondholders to its
shareholders.42 However, if a poison put provision ensures that
bondholders be compensated for only their losses in a takeover
34. This would occur if the interest rates did not reflect the protection of the covenant.
Id. at 939–40. In Amylin, the proxy put provision was not negotiated for, and its inclusion in
the indenture was therefore not reflected in the price or interest rates of the bonds. See infra
Parts IV–V. Thus, I argue that the bondholders would benefit from a windfall if the provisions
were triggered, and the managers benefit from the entrenchment protection that they offer by
deterring shareholders from voting in a way that would triggered.
35. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 939–40.
36. Id. at 940 (citing Asquith & Wizman, supra note 19, at 212). In Asquith and
Wizman’s sample, taking into account bonds with and without traditional covenant protection,
bondholder losses were merely roughly 3 percent of shareholder gains. Id. at n.24.
37. Id. at 941.
38. Id. (citing Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, The Economics of Event Risk: The Case
of Bondholders in Leveraged Buyouts, 15 J. CORP. L. 199, 214 (1990)). However, Kahan and
Klausner acknowledge the possibility that a share value increase could reflect inaccurate pricing
that often occurs prior to takeovers. Id. at n.25 (citing generally Martin Lipton, Corporate
Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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(instead of merely imposing a set price at which the bonds can be
sold back), it encourages efficiency and eliminates the incentive to
adopt an unnecessarily high degree of leverage—thereby increasing
firm value.43
Firms may also increase their value by attracting institutional
investors that will only invest in low-risk bonds.44 Such investors
would also find comfort in the assurance that they can avoid paying
transaction costs of selling their bonds in an illiquid market.45
Furthermore, during times of high takeover volume, when low-risk
bonds are scarce, a change of control covenant can provide an option
for investors.46 Therefore, a firm could potentially increase its value,
and in turn benefit its shareholders, by issuing bonds with poison put
provisions.47
3. Managerial motivation for the board of directors
Naturally, an increase in a firm’s value benefits its directors; if the
company is doing well, the directors have greater job security.
However, directors can use poison puts to benefit themselves in
other ways. Because they have substantial control over the terms of
poison put provisions, they can prevent control transactions that they
oppose.48 Thus, by insulating themselves from hostile change, they
can usurp shareholder power and actually reduce firm value.
Just as shareholders’ and bondholders’ interests do not perfectly
align, directors and shareholders can have conflicting interests.49
Kahan and Klausner discuss directors’ parochial interests, which
might be their true motivation to institute poison put provisions.50
When directors take actions, in pursuit of their personal interests,
that are not in the shareholders’ best interest, the resulting losses are
43. Id. “[Poison puts] may be especially effective in deterring inefficient leveraged
recapitalizations.” Id. at 942.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 942–43.
46. Id. at 943.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Arlen & Talley, supra note 11, at 620 (explaining how managers can use
poison put type provisions to significantly increase the cost of acquisitions, insulating
themselves at the shareholders’ expense).
49. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 944. Directors are concerned with
“compensation, work conditions, job security, reputation, and power,” while shareholders are
primarily interested in the maximization of share values. Id.
50. See id.
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termed the agency cost of equity.51 Shareholder action in the market
for corporate control—e.g., through hostile takeovers and proxy
contests—can be an important mechanism for reducing the agency
cost of equity.52 Not only can hostile takeovers and proxy contests
remove failing directors and replace them with more effective
counterparts, but the mere threat of those actions also incentivizes
directors to work for the shareholders’ interests.53 Thus, to the
extent that hostile control changes promote efficient management
and move corporate assets to their highest value uses, they increase
the firm’s value.54 Conversely, when defense mechanisms like poison
puts insulate directors from the corporate control market, the agency
cost of equity may rise and thereby potentially decrease the value of
the firm.55
In many instances the cost imposed by poison puts is nominal in
comparison to the gains of an acquisition.56 If a poison put only calls
for compensation to bondholders for their takeover related losses, it
may not be much of a deterrent to takeover-related events and
therefore not significantly affect the agency cost of equity.57 Such
provisions could thus lower bondholder risk without harming
shareholders if the bondholder benefit is reflected in the price or
interest rates of the bonds. Directorial decision to include such a

51. Id. (citing Jensen & Meckling, supra note 29, at 327–28).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169–74 (1981);
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841–45 (1981); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965)). But see Lynn A. Stout, The
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789 (2007) (arguing that director
accountability to shareholders may increase agency costs). In addition, Kahan and Klausner
cited to Lipton, supra note 38, at 20–25, as an example of an argument that “takeover threat
induces undesirable responses.” Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 944 n.38.
55. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 944. However, Kahan and Klausner
acknowledge that “some antitakeover devices allow management to protect shareholders from
underpriced or coercive tender offers, or help create an auction among potential acquirors that
may increase the price received by target shareholders.” Id. at n.40 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk,
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1054–56 (1982);
Lipton, supra note 38, at 26). However, they also refer again to Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 54, which argues that “such tactics are not in the ex ante interest of shareholders or
society.” Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 944 n.40.
56. Id. at 945; see supra text accompanying notes 36–38.
57. Id.
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provision could then conceivably be protected by the business
58
judgment rule. However, in other provisions, the triggered remedy
can exceed the loss suffered by bondholders.59 This is particularly
true in the case of proxy puts, which highlights why proxy puts are a
more troublesome entrenchment mechanism and the decision to
implement them in an indenture should be subjected to heightened
scrutiny.
Proxy puts are more troublesome than other poison puts for two
reasons. First, shareholders’ gains in proxy contests are far less than
their gains in hostile takeovers.60 Therefore, even if the triggered
remedy is modest, it can have significant deterrent effect in
preventing shareholders from voting against incumbent
management.61 Second, in a change of control through proxy
election, bond values are likely to be unaffected.62 Because proxy
elections do not directly increase the leverage of the firm or affect
the bond’s credit rating—and thereby increase the agency cost of
debt—preventing them will not decrease the agency cost of debt.
Hence, allowing bondholders to sell back their notes at par value has
catastrophic potential, which would have been the case in Amylin.
Market changes can greatly decrease the value of bonds (while the
actual change of control does not affect them), and so when a put is
triggered after market conditions have lowered the value of a bond,
paying the bondholders could bankrupt the firm. Because
shareholders would naturally want to avoid this outcome, the
entrenchment effect of the puts greatly increases the agency cost of
equity.
Moreover, managers’ substantial control over the terms of
poison put provisions enables them to omit management buyouts
and other friendly acquisitions from the covenant while including

58. While this is certainly a logical possibility, this Note does not attempt to make a
detailed, bright-line rule for when the decision to employ poison put provisions should be
protected by the business judgment rule. Rather, this Note focuses on defining a rule for proxy
puts specifically.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 946 (citing Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A
Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401 (1983)).
61. Id. (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1091–93 (1990)). Kahan and Klausner
refer to the Bebchuk and Kahan’s point that the “reduced likelihood of winning decreases
incentives by potential challengers to initiate a proxy contest.” Id. at n.48.
62. See id. at 945–46.
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hostile takeovers and proxy elections.63 In entering debt indentures,
managers are not required to obtain shareholder approval, and the
complexity of the provisions make it easy for directors to design
them in a self-serving manner without shareholder review.64 Hence,
management can provide incomplete bondholder protection in a way
that increases the agency cost of equity and has no effect on
bondholder interests.65 If a poison put type covenant were to offer
full protection to a bondholder, it would grant full compensation for
any loss that bondholders incur from acquisitions generally—hostile
or friendly—and it could thereby decrease the agency cost of debt.66
However, directors’ primary concern with control changes stems
from the threat of the loss of employment in hostile changes, which
management usually protects against when writing poison put
provisions.67
Management protects itself against hostile changes in three main
ways. First, directors can restrict a poison put’s coverage to
transactions that they disfavor (leaving bondholders at risk for
director favored acquisitions).68 Consequently, this could lower the
firm value by achieving only a nominal reduction of the agency cost
of debt, while at the same time creating an uneven playing field for
hostile acquirers and increasing the agency cost of equity.69 Second,
directors can design a provision that increases the costs of control
changes that threaten their job security but do not threaten the
bondholders.70 This category seems to encompass proxy puts and
would also include non-leveraged hostile acquisitions.71 These
provisions would increase the firm’s agency cost of equity.72 Finally, a
63. Id. at 947.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 948.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 949.
68. Id.
69. Id. Because friendly bidders would not face the hurdle of the put provision, they
would be at an incredible advantage over hostile bidders, who would have to deal with the
increased costs associated with triggering the put. See id. at 947.
70. See id. at 949.
71. See id. at 949–50. Kahan and Klausner also considered that bondholders may
actually favor proxy contests and non-leveraged hostile acquisitions because new management
could increase performance without increasing bondholder risk. Id. at n.57. In such a case,
there would be no sense in awarding any compensation to the bondholders after the
transaction.
72. Id. at 950.
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third category includes poison puts that provide for a supracompensatory remedy to bondholders in the event that unwanted
acquisitions occurred.73 This increases the company’s agency cost of
equity without a reduction in its agency cost of debt.74 Proxy puts
may also fall into this category because of their potential to
compensate far in excess of bondholder loss.
The effects poison puts have on the agency cost of debt and
equity should have great bearing on their legality. Using these effects
to draw a definitive line is difficult, but the ideal “bondholderprotective covenants”—in which all leveraged acquisitions and
recapitalizations are covered and bondholders are only compensated
for the actual decrease in bond values resulting from the
transactions75—should be legal, and their use should be within
directorial discretion. Such transactions can minimize the agency cost
of debt and equity, and a board’s decision to employ them could
therefore reasonably be within the protection of the business
judgment rule.76 Such a provision should probably not be the limit
for legal poison put provisions. There is probably room for
directorial discretion beyond that, and while this Note does not
attempt to define the boundaries, it does contend that proxy puts
should be beyond them. They constitute a form of the “ideal
management protective covenant” that Kahan and Klausner
describe.77 They are triggered by proxy challenges and provide for a
supra-compensatory remedy, increasing the firm’s agency cost of
equity without reducing the agency cost of debt.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
Since the mid ’80s, the Delaware courts have presided over many
influential cases that now govern Delaware law in hostile takeover
contexts. Before 1985, the courts merely applied the business

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See id. (“The ideal management-protective covenant, in contrast, would cover only
hostile acquisitions and proxy challenges, and it would provide a supra-compensatory remedy
in the event that either of these control changes occurs. This covenant would both increase the
firm’s agency cost of equity and fail to achieve potential reductions in the agency cost of
debt.”).
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judgment rule to director conduct even in defense of hostile
takeovers.78
Under this deferential standard, hope was bleak for challenging
directorial defensive measures. Once directors were under that
protection, shareholders would have to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the “directors’ [defensive actions] were primarily
based on perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach of
duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being
uninformed . . . .”79
In 1985, however, the Delaware Supreme Court applied an
innovative and aggressive new standard for reviewing board defensive
action against hostile offers. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
introduced a new, “intermediate” standard of review,80 which—
although it perhaps has not been the innovative change that it was
originally anticipated to be81—has led to interesting and controversial
judicial decisions and scholarly works.
A. The Unocal Test: “Intermediate” Scrutiny for Hostile Takeovers
In Unocal, Mesa, Inc., (a 13 percent Unocal shareholder)
commenced a two-tier “front loaded” tender offer for 37 percent of
Unocal’s shares in an effort to gain majority control of the
company.82 The Unocal board rejected the offer and, to defend
against it, instituted a self-tender offer (a form of “poison pill”).83
According to the terms of the self-tender, if Mesa acquired its
intended shares then Unocal would buy the remaining 49 percent of

78. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
(explaining that “the business judgment rule, including the standards by which director
conduct is judged, [was] applicable in the context of a takeover” (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480
A.2d 691, 627 (Del. 1984))). In Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), the Delaware
Supreme Court defined the business judgment rule as a “presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Id. at 812.
79. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
80. Thompson & Smith, supra note 11, at 281.
81. See id. at 293. “Regardless of one’s predilections about the initial decision, however,
the subsequent development of the Unocal standard has failed to live up to its early billing.”
Id. Included in the initial fanfare was Chancellor Allen, calling it “the most innovative and
promising case in our recent corporation law.” Id. (citing City Capital Assocs., L.P. v. Interco,
Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
82. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
83. Id. at 951.
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the outstanding shares—excluding Mesa from the proposal.84 Mesa
sued the Unocal Board in the Court of Chancery and won.85
When the case reached the Delaware Supreme Court on appeal,
however, the court was prepared to establish a new standard for
takeover situations. The issue on appeal was whether the Unocal
board had “the power and duty to oppose a takeover threat [that] it
reasonably perceived to be harmful to the corporate enterprise, and if
so, [was] its action here entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule?”86
In its analysis, the court opined that “[b]ecause of the
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests [in takeover situations], rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders,” the board is subject to an “enhanced duty.”87
This “enhanced duty” requires directors to meet a two-part test
before they can receive the benefit of the business judgment rule.
First, directors must demonstrate that they did not act “solely or
primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office;” they
must have reasonably perceived a threat to the company.88 Second,
they must show that their actions were proportional, or “reasonable
in relation to the threat posed.”89 Interestingly, despite the
heightened scrutiny, the court determined that the directors in
Unocal satisfied the two-part test and were, therefore, entitled to the
protection of the business judgment rule.90
B. Liquid Audio and Blasius: A Compelling Justification Standard
Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed
directorial defensive tactics in a somewhat different vein than Unocal
in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.91 In Blasius, the plaintiff—a
9% shareholder of Atlas, Corp.—challenged the Atlas directors’
84. Id.
85. Id. at 951–52.
86. Id. at 953 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 954.
88. Id. at 955 (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964); Kors v. Carey,
158 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. Ch. 1960)). With this prong, the court required that defense
measures be motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its
stockholders—i.e., not entrenchment. Id. (citing Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554–55).
89. Id. at 955. This prong requires directors to analyze “the nature of the takeover bid
and its effect on the corporate enterprise.” Id.
90. Id. at 956–58.
91. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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action to add two new members to its seven member board.92 The
addition was controversial because the board’s motivation was to
preclude Atlas’s shareholders from electing a majority of new
directors through the plaintiff’s consent solicitation.93 The issue then
facing Chancellor Allen was whether a board can act “consistently
with its fiduciary duty when it acts, in good faith and with
appropriate care, for the primary purpose of preventing or impeding
an unaffiliated majority of shareholders from expanding the board
and electing a new majority.”94
The interesting aspect of the case was that Chancellor Allen
determined that, in adding the board members, the directors “acted
on their view of the corporation’s interest and not selfishly,”95 and,
therefore, apparently under the protection of the business judgment
rule. However, the Chancellor qualified the question posed as not
one of fiduciary duty, but one of authority “as between the fiduciary
and the beneficiary.”96 In Allen’s eyes, this question of authority
distinguished acts that interfere with the effectiveness of stockholder
voting from other Unocal type claims.97 He reasoned that the
“central importance of the [shareholder] franchise to the scheme of
corporate governance, requires that, in this setting, [the Unocal
intermediate scrutiny] rule not be applied and that closer scrutiny be
accorded.”98
In reaching that conclusion, Chancellor Allen reasoned, in
language now famous in corporate law, that “[t]he shareholder
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy
of directorial power rests.”99 He elaborated that the only two
protections afforded shareholders against inadequate board business
performance are selling their stock and voting to replace board
members.100 The chancellor opined:
[W]hether the vote is seen functionally as an unimportant
formalism, or as an important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 652.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of power by some
(directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they
do not own. Thus . . . matters involving the integrity of the
shareholder voting process involve consideration not present in any
other context in which directors exercise delegated power.101

In sum, infringing on the shareholder franchise’s right to vote would
be an inappropriate usurpation of shareholder authority by the board
of directors.
Chancellor Allen further reasoned that the ordinary
considerations that implicated the business judgment rule were not
involved in the shareholder voting context.102 He argued that rather
than exercising the corporation’s power over its property, or
respecting its rights, every time “an incumbent board seeks to thwart
a shareholder majority” it will involve the question of who has
authority regarding a matter of internal corporate governance.103 In
such a situation, a court may not leave to the “agent finally to decide
so long as he does so honestly and competently”; therefore, the
business judgment rule cannot apply.104 Although the corporate law
theory gives directors power as agents of the shareholders, “it does
not create Platonic masters.”105 Instead of the deferential business
judgment rule, in a Blasius-type case the board of directors must
“bear[] the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification
for such action.”106
The Blasius case did not reach the Delaware Supreme Court on
appeal, but its holding was adopted by the court in a later case, MM
Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.107 In Liquid Audio, the
plaintiff shareholders (“MM”) sued for injunctive relief against the
Liquid Audio board’s action to expand its board members from five
to seven.108 The board enacted this expansion after MM had
nominated two directors for an upcoming election to Liquid Audio’s
staggered board.109 The court, in an opinion written by Justice

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 661.
813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1123.
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Holland, found that the board had taken this action “for the primary
purpose of interfering with and impeding the effectiveness of the
shareholder franchise in electing successor directors.”110 Justice
Holland concluded that the board’s actions implicated the Blasius
compelling justification standard within the Unocal test.111 The
Holland court held that:
When the primary purpose of a board of directors’ defensive
measure is to interfere with or impede the effective exercise of the
shareholder franchise in a contested election for directors, the
board must first demonstrate a compelling justification for such
action as a condition precedent to any judicial consideration of
reasonableness and proportionately.112

In sum, the court fully adopted and integrated the Blasius
compelling justification standard into the Unocal test as a condition
precedent to the reasonableness and proportionality prong.

110. Id. at 1131. The board members testified that they were concerned that the two of
the incumbent directors may resign if MM’s nominees were elected, due to the “acrimonious
relationship between MM and Liquid Audio.” Id. at 1126. Because they felt that if either one
or two of the incumbent directors resigned it could jeopardize an impending merger that the
incumbent directors favored and “run an undue risk to the shareholders,” they acted to
“minimize the impact of the election of MM’s nominees.” Id. at 1125–26.
111. Id. at 1131 (“This case presents a paragon of when the compelling justification
standard of Blasius must be applied within Unocal’s requirement that any defensive measure be
proportionate and reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”). Earlier in the opinion, Justice
Holland recounted that both the supreme court and the chancery court had recognized the
“substantial degree of congruence” between the rationale for the heightened Blasius standard
and the “logical extension of that rationale within the context of the Unocal enhanced
standard of judicial review.” Id. at 1129 (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del. 1992);
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. CH. 2000)). He summarized Gilbert v.
El Paso Co. as holding that the Unocal standard must be applied “whenever a board . . . adopts
any defensive measure ‘in response to some threat to corporate policy and effectiveness which
touches upon issues of control.’” Id. (quoting 575 A.2d 1131, 1144 (Del. 1990)). He then
interpreted Stroud to show how the Blasius compelling justification standard fit into Unocal:
“A board’s unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure touching upon ‘issues of control’
that purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders is strongly suspect under Unocal, and cannot
be sustained without a ‘compelling justification.’” Id. at 1130 (quoting Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92
n.3).
112. Id. at 1132. Important to note in the holding is that the defensive actions taken by
the board do not actually need to succeed in preventing the shareholders from gaining a seat
on the board, and the contested election does not need to involve an competition for outright
control of the board. Id. All that is required is that the board’s defensive actions were taken
with the primary purpose of “interfering with or impeding the effectiveness of the stockholder
vote.” Id.
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IV. SAN ANTONIO FIRE & POLICE PENSION FUND V. AMYLIN
PHARMACEUTICALS
The legality of two poison put provisions was at the heart of San
Antonio Fire and Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals.113
In Amylin, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund (the “Pension
Fund”) sued Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (“Amylin”) and its board
members to enable the board to disable the change of control
provisions in both a bond indenture for notes and a credit agreement
for a senior secured credit facility114—both proxy puts.
A. Facts of the Case
In 2007, the Amylin board’s Finance Committee approved the
issuance of 3.00% convertible senior notes (“2007 Notes”).115 The
indenture for the 2007 Notes (“Indenture”) contained a change of
control covenant that is the central piece to this lawsuit.116 The
change of control provision is in § 11.01 of the Indenture and “gives
the noteholders the right to demand redemption of any or all of
their notes at face value upon the occurrence of certain events,
including a Fundamental Change, as defined in the Indenture.”117
The Indenture provides that a “Fundamental Change” occurs if, “at
any time the Continuing Directors do not constitute a majority of
the Company’s Board of Directors,” defining “Continuing
Directors” as:
(i) individuals who on the Issue Date constituted the Board of
Directors and (ii) any new directors whose election to the Board of
Directors or whose nomination for election by the stockholders of
the Company was approved by at least a majority of the directors
then still in office (or a duly constituted committee thereof) either

113. 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009).
114. San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No.
4446-VCL at 2–3 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2009), available at http://law.du.edu/
documents/corporate-governance/governance-cases/Antonio-Fire-Police-Memorandum-Opi
nion.pdf.
115. Id. In May 2007, the board had adopted resolutions that authorized certain
members of senior management to negotiate the terms and conditions of the 2007 Notes. Id.
at 2. The board also made the Finance Committee the “Pricing Committee” for the notes,
giving them full board authority to negotiate and issue the notes. It was the Pricing
Committee that ultimately approved the notes’ issuance. Id.
116. Id. at 3–4.
117. Id. (citing Fourth Am. Compl. Ex. A § 11.01).
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who were directors on the Issue Date or whose election or
nomination for election was previously so approved.118

Although the Pricing Committee had extensive discussions about
various terms of the notes before authorizing their issuance, the
proxy put was never brought to the attention of the board of
119
directors.
In addition to the provision in the Indenture, this case also
involved a proxy put in Amylin’s senior secured credit facility (the
“Credit Agreement”), which Amylin entered into with Bank of
120
America, N.A., (“BANA”) shortly after issuing the 2007 Notes.
The proxy put in the Credit Agreement was more explicitly
confining that the provision in the Indenture, as it accelerated the
121
debt due under the agreement if a Change of Control occurred.
Although counsel for Amylin tried to define a Change of Control
118. Id. at 4 (quoting Fourth Am. Compl. Ex. A § 1.01). At all times relevant to this
case, and at the time this case was tried, the Amylin board consisted of twelve Continuing
Directors. Id.
119. See id. at 4–5. The drafting history reveals that the originally circulated drafts of the
description of the 2007 Notes and the of the Indenture contained the Continuing Directors
provision. Id. Prior to issuing the notes, the Pricing Committee worked extensively with its
management, legal advisors, and underwriters to structure them, after which it consulted
outside counsel on various terms. Id. at 4. During that process, the proxy put provision was
not brought up, even after the directors asked counsel if there was anything “unusual or not
customary” in the Indenture. Id. (citing Bradbury Dep. Tr. 77).
120. Id. at 5–6. Although Amylin entered into the Credit Agreement after it issued the
2007 Notes, the Finance Committee authorized Amylin officers to enter the agreement almost
one year prior to the notes’ issuance. Id. at 5.
121. Id. at 6. A Change of control in the Credit agreement is defined as including:
an event or series of events by which . . . (b) during any period of 24 consecutive
months, a majority of the members of the board of directors or other equivalent
governing body of the Company cease to be composed of individuals
(i) who were members of that board or equivalent governing body on the first
day of such period,
(ii) whose election or nomination to that board or equivalent governing body
was approved by individuals referred to in clause (i) above constituting at the time of
such election or nomination at least a majority of that board or equivalent governing
body, or
(iii) whose election or nomination to that board or other equivalent governing
body was approved by individuals referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) above
constituting at the time of such election or nomination at least a majority of that
board or equivalent governing body (excluding, in the case of both clause (ii) and
clause (iii), any individual whose initial nomination for, or assumption of office as, a
member of that board or equivalent governing body occurs as a result of an actual
or threatened solicitation of proxies or consents for the election or removal of one
or more directors by any person or group other than a solicitation for the election of
one or more directors by or on behalf of the board of directors).
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using the same language as the Indenture, BANA’s counsel insisted
122
on the version that ended up in the agreement.
The proxy puts became relevant when, on consecutive days, two
stockholders independently notified Amylin of their intention to
each nominate a slate of five directors to the twelve-person Amylin
board.123 First, Icahn Partners LP (“Icahn”), an approximately 8.8%
stockholder, notified Amylin, and the following day, Eastbourne
Capital Management, LLC (“Eastbourne”), a 12.5% stockholder,
followed suit.124 While neither stockholder’s nominated slate would
change a majority of the board alone, if both succeeded without the
board’s approval, the proxy puts would be triggered.
A few days later, Eastbourne sent a letter to Amylin asking for
the board to take the necessary action to prevent the Continuing
Directors provision from being triggered.125 However, Eastbourne
requested that the board assemble an approved combination of
directors that included a large number from each of Icahn’s and
Eastbourne’s nominees.126
Amylin responded to the dissident slates in its 10K filing—
explaining the proxy put provisions and highlighting the potential
adverse consequences the company would face if they were
triggered.127 Just over one week later, Eastbourne mailed a letter to
the board in which it questioned the legitimacy of the proxy put
provisions.128 Eastbourne encouraged the board to still “approve”
the dissident slates, but to do anything necessary to remove any
obstacles to the stockholder franchise.129
B. Litigation
The Pension Fund filed suit against Amylin and its individual
directors on March 24, 2009. In its original suit, the Pension Fund
requested declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging three claims of
breach of fiduciary duties:

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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(1) [B]reaches of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by the
board of Amylin in the adoption of the Credit Agreement and the
Indenture, insofar as they both contained Continuing Directors
provisions, (2) breaches of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
by Amylin’s board in failing to approve the dissident nominees in
order to defuse the Continuing Directors provision of the
Indenture, and (3) breaches of the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty in the allegedly misleading and coercive manner in which
Amylin’s board chose to disclose the risks presented by the
Continuing Directors provisions in the company’s Form 10-K.130

Additionally, Eastbourne requested a mandatory injunction forcing
the directors to approve the shareholders’ nominees.131 Shortly after
the Pension Fund filed suit, Amylin filed its preliminary proxy
statement, followed by a proxy “fight letter” stating:
While we believe that the Board has the ability to approve any
nominees proposed by Icahn or Eastbourne at any time up to the
election in order to nullify the debt acceleration provision, we
cannot ensure that our bondholders will concur with that view. In
fact, we requested confirmation of our view from the trustee of the
[2007] notes and the trustee has refused to confirm our view. To
protect the company and its shareholders, this issue will need to be
resolved in court.132

Subsequent to the “fight letter,” the Pension Fund filed two
amended complaints, adding BANA and the trustee of the 2007
Notes (the “Trustee”) as defendants and seeking declaratory relief
establishing the board’s sole right and power to “approve”
stockholder nominees.133 After Amylin and its directors filed an
134
answer, the Pension Fund moved for partial summary judgment
that the Credit Agreement’s proxy put was unenforceable as a matter
of law.135 Further, the Pension Fund moved for summary judgment
giving the board “the right and power to approve the stockholder
nominees for the purpose of the Indenture.”136
130. Id. at 9.
131. Id. at 9–10.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 10–11.
134. The answer also contained a cross-claim by Amylin against the Trustee. Id. at 11.
The claim against the Trustee sought declaratory relief that the board had the right to approve
the election of any of the dissident nominees at any time prior to the election. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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C. The Pension Fund and Amylin Reach a Partial Settlement
About three weeks after the Pension Fund filed its complaint,
Amylin and the Pension Fund announced that they had reached a
partial settlement.137 The board released a public statement
summarizing the terms:
[T]he Board has determined, subject only to the entry of a final,
non-appealable order prior to May 27, 2009 declaring that the
Board possesses the contractual right to do so, that the Board will
“approve” the Icahn Capital LP and Eastbourne Capital
management L.L.C. nominees for [the purpose of the Continuing
Directors provision of the Indenture].138

In return for that released statement, the Pension fund agreed to
drop its loyalty claim, to refrain from seeking damages against
Amylin or the board, dismiss its claim of coercive disclosure in the
Form 10-K without prejudice, and dismiss the fiduciary duty claim
for the board’s failure to approve the stockholder nominees.139
Following the settlement, Amylin moved for partial summary
judgment for its cross-claim against the Trustee.140
After the settlement, Amylin and BANA entered into a consent
waiver agreement that waived any event of default that would result
141
if the Credit Agreement’s proxy put was triggered. The court was
therefore satisfied that the claims against BANA were moot, but
determined that the resolution of the BANA claims did not affect the
142
claims concerning the Indenture.
Soon after the BANA claims
were resolved, Eastbourne and Icahn both reduced the number of
their nominees in their definitive proxy statements—Eastbourne
from five to three, and Icahn from five to two.143 Consequently, the
Trustee argued that the issue was not ripe because there was no
longer potential for a change in the majority of the board.144
However, both the Pension Fund and Amylin contended that even if
only five nominees were elected whether or not they were

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

788

Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 11–12.
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Continuing Directors would be critical in the following year’s
stockholder meeting.145
D. The Court’s Analysis
The court first addressed “whether or not the . . . board [had]
both the power and the right under the Indenture to approve the
stockholder nominees.”146 Considering the matter one of contract
interpretation, the court first looked to the language of the
Indenture.147 The language was not clearly unambiguous as both
parties argued for differing meanings of the word “approve.”148
First, the Trustee argued that “approve” should be interpreted as
synonymous with “endorse or recommend.”149 The court took issue
with this argument because, under the Trustee’s logic, the board
would never be able to approve a shareholder-nominated slate of
directors—for the purposes of the Indenture—while, simultaneously,
endorsing its own slate.150 Conversely, Amylin argued that the court
should adopt the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “approve”:
“‘to approve’ means ‘to give formal sanction to; to confirm
authoritatively.’”151 According to that definition, “while
endorsement or recommendation may necessarily imply approval, the
reverse is not true.”152 Thus, the board could sanction the
nomination of a dissident slate without endorsing its candidacy, and,

145. Id.
146. Id. at 15. At this point, the Amylin board had already agreed that it would approve
the insurgent parties’ nominees if the court determined that it had the power. Id.
147. Id. at 17. “Indentures are to be read strictly and to the extent they do not expressly
restrict the rights of the issuer, the issuer is left with the freedom to act, subject only to the
boundaries of other positive law.” Id. (citing In re Loral Space & Commc’ns, Inc. Consol.
Litig., 2008 WL 4293781, at *35 (Del. Ch.)).
148. Id.
149. Id. The Board recounted the Trustee’s argument:
[t]he Board’s determination not to recommend the election of any of the Dissident
Nominees, to recommend its own competing slate, and that the election of the
Dissident Nominees would not be in the best interests of the Company—
determinations that have not changed as a result of the Partial Settlement—simply
cannot be reconciled with the plain meaning of the term “approval.” To the
contrary, such determinations by the Board clearly indicate disapproval.
Id. (citing Trustee’s Br. In Opp’n to Pl.’s and Amylin’s Mot. for Summ. J. 31–32 (emphasis in
original)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (8th ed. 2004)).
152. Id. at 17–18.
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meanwhile, still recommend and support its own slate of
nominees.153 The court agreed with Amylin, cautioning that a
provision incorporating the Trustee’s proposed meaning, with “such
an eviscerating effect on the stockholder franchise[,] would raise
grave concerns.”154
Although the court determined that the board had the power to
approve the nominees, the question remained as to their right of
approval. Did the board properly exercise that right in this case? The
court articulated the issue, “[t]he key question is whether approval
by the board, under the given circumstances, comports with the
company’s implied duty of good faith and fair dealing which inheres
in all contracts, including the Indenture.”155 The court looked to the
rule from Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic,156 which allows the board to
approve stockholder nominees if it determines in good faith that the
election of at least one of the dissident nominees would “not be
materially adverse to the interests of the corporation or its
stockholders.”157 While the court identified the appropriate rule for
the instant case, it found the application of that rule to be
problematic.158
The court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence
before it to apply the Hill Stores test.159 Although the court
acknowledged that two “sets of circumstances” cast some light onto
the board’s decision-making process, it disregarded them as “less
than helpful.”160 First, the court recognized that the board’s proxy
fight letters potentially demonstrated that the board’s actions failed
the Hill Stores test.161 Yet, the court dismissed the fight letters as
mere “election puffery,” insufficient to show the board’s true
153. Id. at 18.
154. Id. at 19. The court reasoned that Trustee’s reading was far too restrictive,
essentially making the provision an entrenchment mechanism. Id. at 18. More specifically, the
Indenture would prohibit any change whatsoever in the board’s majority as a result of
contested elections, throughout the lifetime of the note. Id. at 18–19. Were such a meaning
incorporated, the court would require that the board demonstrate that it at least had a good
faith belief that it was “obtaining in return extraordinarily valuable economic benefits for the
corporation that would not otherwise be available to it.” Id.
155. Id. at 19–20.
156. 769 A.2d 88 (Del. Ch. 2000).
157. Amylin, C.A. No. 4446-VCL at 21.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 21–22.
160. Id. at 22.
161. Id. at 22–23.
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deliberations.162 Second, the court conceded that “the posture in
which the board appears to have made its decision to approve” also
was problematic.163 Namely, the board waited more than one month
after the insurgent stockholders nominated the dissident slate to
approve them, and when it did approve them, it was as part of its
partial settlement with the Pension Fund.164 However, the court
concluded that while these “circumstances at least raise[d] a question
whether the board’s decision to approve was made in a good faith
exercise of its considered business judgment,” the “underdeveloped
state of the record” coupled with the post-trial developments—i.e.,
the dissident slates decreasing from ten nominees to five—
demonstrated that the issue was not yet ripe and should be
relitigated in the future, if necessary.165
Finally, the court considered the Pension Fund’s claim that the
Amylin board breached its duty of care by adopting the Indenture in
the first place, in light of the proxy put provision.166 The Pension
Fund’s main assertion was that the Pricing Committee breached its
duty of care by failing to discover the proxy put during its approval
167
process for the Indenture. However, because it was a care claim,
the court concluded that the board was entitled to the deferential
168
treatment of the business judgment rule. The court reasoned that
the board’s failure to ascertain and reject the presence of this
provision was not “the sort of conduct generally imagined when
considering the concept of gross negligence, typically defined as a

162. Id.
163. Id. at 23.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 23–24.
166. Id. at 25–26.
167. Id. at 25. The Pension fund further argued that Amylin’s CEO and CFO both
admitted that they were entirely unaware of the existence of the proxy put provisions until they
read about them once the proxy contest began. Id. The court dismissed this information as
unhelpful to the Pension Fund’s claim, because the CFO was not a director and there was no
evidence that the CEO was on the Pricing Committee. Id.
168. See id. at 25. The court reasoned that the duty of care requires that
in making business decisions, directors must consider all material information
reasonably available, and that the directors’ process is actionable only if grossly
negligent . . . . [T]he standard for judging the informational component of the
directors’ decionmaking does not mean that the Board must be informed of every
fact. The Board is responsible for considering only material facts that are reasonably
available, not those that are immaterial or out of the Board’s reasonable reach.
Id. at 25 (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000)).
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substantial deviation from the standard of care.”169 Because “the
board retained highly-qualified counsel . . . , sought advice from [its]
management and investment bankers as to the terms of the
agreement . . . , [and] asked its counsel if there was anything
‘unusual or not customary’ in the terms of the Notes,” the court was
satisfied that the board did not act grossly negligent and held in
170
favor of the defendants.
Nevertheless, in dicta, the court recognized that “[t]his case does
highlight the troubling reality that corporations and their counsel
routinely negotiate contract terms that may, in some circumstances,
impinge on the free exercise of the stockholder franchise.”171 The
court gave two reasons why this is particularly troubling when
negotiating a debt instrument.172 First, few events “have the
potential to be more catastrophic for a corporation than the
triggering of an event of default under one of its debt
agreements.”173 Second, when the board is negotiating these
instruments, it is dealing “with rights that belong first and foremost
to the stockholders (i.e., the stockholder franchise),” and it “must be
especially solicitous to its duties both to the corporation and to its
stockholders.”174 The truth of this notion is particularly relevant
concerning transactions with debtholders—whose interests “may be
directly adverse to those of the stockholders.”175 Particularly, terms
that may limit the stockholders’ discretionary range in exercising the
franchise should be highlighted to the board, thereby enabling the
board “to exercise its fully informed business judgment.”176
Ironically, though the court’s holding grants the directors the
benefit of the business judgment rule, the court’s cautionary dicta
recounts some of the key public policy reasons for not immediately
granting directors that privilege in the case of proxy puts and why,
instead, the directors should be subject to the Blasius standard of
showing a compelling justification.
169. Id. at 26.
170. Id. The court reasoned that “[c]ertainly, no one suggests that the directors’ duty of
care required them to review, discuss, and comprehend every word of the 98-page Indenture.”
Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 27.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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E. Appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court

The case reached the Delaware Supreme Court on appeal of
several issues.177 The Pension Fund appealed the Court of Chancery’s
decisions to refrain from validating the directors’ approval of the
stockholder slates, not invalidate the proxy put in the Credit
Agreement, and dismiss the care claim.178 However, five days after
the arguments concluded, the court adopted the Chancery Court’s
opinion and surmised its decision in one sentence and one footnote.
The opinion, in its entirety stated:
This 5th day of October 2009, upon consideration of the briefs of
the parties, and their contentions in oral argument, it appears to
the Court that the order and judgment of the Court of Chancery
should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons set forth in
its decision dated May 12, 2009.179

The footnote that accompanied the opinion was slightly longer.
The Court of Chancery determined . . . that [the] board . . . did
not breach its duty of care in authorizing the corporation to enter
into the Indenture Agreement, with its “proxy put” provision. That
determination was correct, not only for the reasons made explicit in
the Court’s opinion, but also for one that is implicit: no showing
was made that approving the “proxy put” at that point in time
would involve any reasonably foreseeable material risk to the
corporation or its stockholders. That risk materialized only months
later, and was aggravated by the unexpected, cataclysmic decline in
the nation’s financial system and capital markets beginning in the
Spring of 2008.180

And at that, the board rejected the Pension Fund’s arguments
and affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision.

177. See, e.g., San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 981
A.2d 1173, 1173 n.2 (Del. 2009).
178. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v.
Amylin Pharms., Inc., 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009) (No. 268).
179. Id. at 1173.The decision is outlined above in Part III.4.
180. Id.
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V. DIRECTORS WHO APPROVE AGREEMENTS WITH PROXY PUTS
SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO THE COMPELLING JUSTIFICATION
STANDARD
Chancellor Allen’s profound language from Blasius provides the
proper framework for analyzing the legality of the proxy puts in
Amylin, and all proxy puts generally: “The shareholder franchise is
the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of
directorial power rests.”181 He further reasoned that “it is clear that
[the shareholder vote] is critical to the theory that legitimates the
exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast
aggregations of property that they do not own.”182 Because the
proxy puts in Amylin infringed on the shareholder franchise’s
authority in a contested election, I contend that the Delaware courts
should have required the Amylin board to show a compelling
justification for including them in the Indenture and the Credit
Agreement. Moreover, I propose a rule that any time a board of
directors enters into an agreement with a proxy put, it must show
that it did so with a compelling justification.
My proposed rule aligns with the policy underlying the Delaware
courts’ opinions in Blasius and Liquid Audio. In criticizing the
Amylin opinions, I do not contend that Vice Chancellor Lamb’s
answer to the Pension Fund’s care claim was necessarily wrong, but I
do assert that, in addressing it, he answered the wrong question. As
Chancellor Allen reasoned in Blasius, the ordinary considerations
that implicate the business judgment rule are not present in the
183
shareholder voting context and were not present in Amylin. Even
though, similar to the board in Blasius, the Amylin board likely did
184
the proxy puts’ infringement on
not breach its duty of care,
shareholder voting posed a question of authority “as between the
185
fiduciary and the beneficiary,” not a question of fiduciary duty.
181. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 659.
184. As the court noted, by retaining sophisticated counsel, working intensely with
management and investment bankers, and asking its counsel if there was anything unusual in
the agreement, the board easily cleared the low gross negligence. Moreover, directors should
not be expected to review every page of an agreement. See San Antonio Fire & Police Pension
Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., C.A. No. 4444-VCL, at 26–27 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2009),
available
at
http://law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/governance-cases/
Antonio-Fire-Police-Memorandum-Opinion.pdf.
185. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 658.
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Because the proxy puts enabled the incumbent board to “thwart a
shareholder majority,” they implicated a question of who had
186
authority regarding a matter of internal corporate governance.
According to Chancellor Allen’s reasoning, the business judgment
rule cannot apply in such circumstances, and the board must “bear[]
the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for
187
such action.”
My rule is also supported by the Liquid Audio interpretation of
Blasius and its adoption into the Unocal test. The Liquid Audio
holding fits Blasius into Unocal by requiring directors to
demonstrate a compelling justification for any defensive measure that
has the primary purpose of interfering with or impeding “the
effective exercise of the shareholder franchise in a contested election
for directors,” as a condition precedent to the Unocal reasonableness
and proportionality inquiries.188 Proxy puts absolutely interfere with
and impede the shareholder franchise’s right to participate in the
proxy election of directors. In Amylin, because the company could
not afford to pay off the 2007 notes at face value or handle the
acceleration of the debt in the Credit Agreement, the two dissident
slates were unable to run successful proxy campaigns. In fact, they
eventually reduced their slates to a number that would not constitute
a majority. The Delaware courts should not have had to answer
questions of the board’s power and right to approve the slates,
because the provisions themselves should not have been valid
without a showing of compelling justification to include them in the
agreements.
While the facts of Blasius and Liquid Audio do not perfectly align
with Amylin, the reasoning and underlying policy of the cases
support my rule for proxy puts and its application in Amylin. The
notable factual distinction in Amylin from both Liquid Audio and
Blasius is that the Amylin directors allegedly approved of the
Indenture and the Credit Agreement without knowing about the
proxy put provisions, while the directors in the other cases acted
intentionally, but in good faith.189 This distinction is of little
consequence, however, to my proposed rule and to the underlying
policy rationale from Blasius and Liquid Audio. Whether or not the
186.
187.
188.
189.

See id. at 660.
See id. at 661.
MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003).
See id. at 662.
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directors knew that they were acting outside their authority does not
change the fact that they were doing so. Directors should not have
authority to approve a provision that would “thwart a shareholder
190
majority,” “interfere with or impede the effective exercise of the
191
shareholder franchise in a contested election for directors,” and
ultimately entrench an incumbent board. Shareholders have only two
key protections against inadequate business performance—selling
their shares and voting.192 The Amylin board, by approving the
Indenture and the Credit Agreement (both of which contained
proxy puts) took one of those protections away. Therefore, their
decision to do so must have been made with a compelling
justification.
The agency cost framework also demonstrates public policy
reasons for requiring a compelling justification to employ proxy
193
puts. As Kahan and Klausner’s analysis demonstrates, proxy puts
are the “ideal management protective covenant,” and they almost
assuredly increase the agency cost of equity without decreasing the
agency cost of debt.194 While they likely give no additional protection
to bondholders, they do provide them a supra-compensatory remedy
195
if the puts are triggered. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where
proxy puts should be allowed, and, like Chancellor Allen in Blasius, I
see the advantage of clarity and predictability in a bright-line, per se
196
rule invalidating proxy puts. However, as Chancellor Allen finally
197
concluded, I recognize that it is impossible to foresee all scenarios
in which a board could implement a proxy put. Therefore, I am
satisfied with the high burden of requiring a board that uses a proxy
put to show a compelling justification.
Applying the compelling justification standard makes Amylin an
easy case. The fact that the board did not even know that the
provisions were in the agreements cuts against them in this test.
How could they have had a compelling justification to put the
provisions in when they were not even aware of their existence?

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
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Id. at 660.
Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d at 1132.
Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
See supra Part II.
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 950.
See id. at 934–50.
See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661.
See id. at 662.
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There is no evidence that they used the proxy puts as negotiating
leverage to obtain more favorable interest rates, or anything at all, in
return. They were merely included as parts of long agreements. The
board clearly had no compelling justification to include the proxy
puts, and they therefore should have been invalidated.
VI. CONCLUSION
The hostile takeover craze of the 1980s has slightly abated in the
past twenty years, but the lasting effects of the decade are still felt.
The antitakeover defenses that the ’80s spawned have affected
corporate governance in complex and intriguing ways. Poison puts
are no exception.
In San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Amylin’s board of directors employed a
particular kind of poison put—a proxy put. Both Delaware courts
refrained from truly confronting the legality of the proxy puts, as
they deferred to the board’s business judgment in failing to identify
and remove the provisions. I contend that the court erred in not
requiring the board of directors to demonstrate a compelling
justification for implementing the proxy puts.
In this Note, I do not attempt to craft a comprehensive rule for
all poison put provisions, but I do propose a rule for proxy puts.
Because of the unique infringement that proxy puts impose on the
shareholder franchise, any directors who enter into an agreement
with a proxy put provision must show that they did so with a
compelling justification. In Amylin, the board did not demonstrate a
compelling justification, and, therefore, the proxy puts at issue
should have been invalidated.
Marcus Kai Hintze
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